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Rebuilding the Board: 
An Argument for Structural Change, 
Over Policy Prescriptions, at the NLRB 
R. Alexander Acosta* 
Whither the Board, the title of this symposium, is an obvious pun.  The 
Board’s relevance appears to be diminishing, and its future appears        
uncertain.  These twin themes are not new to labor law scholars and practi-
tioners, as the extensive scholarship on these issues makes clear.  Despite 
decades of critical scholarship, however, the Board remains resistant to 
change and thus remains in a slow, withering decline.   
My lunch remarks today offer a perspective that is in many ways unu-
sual.  I served on the Board for a short time; yet unlike many of my Board 
colleagues, I did not arrive at the Board with a strong tradition of represent-
ing labor or management.  I now serve in the legal academy; yet unlike 
many of my present colleagues, I have experienced first-hand the internal 
dynamics of the Board.  I hope my perspective offers new and useful in-
sight into why the Board resists change, and perhaps helps encourage a 
future Board to take on this challenge.   
My conclusion, in the end, presents a challenge to scholars and Board 
Members alike.  Although scholars have repeatedly identified problems 
with the operation of the Board and crafted creative and practical solutions 
to address these problems, the Board has routinely ignored scholarly sug-
gestions.  The reasons for this resistance to change are not based on policy, 
and in fact several Chairmen – from Gould to Liebman – would agree that 
many of these suggested changes would as a matter of policy benefit the 
Board.  The reasons that change has not occurred, rather, flow from the 
Board’s internal operational structure, developed over time in response to a 
variety of factors including confirmation politics.  This suggests that im-
provements in the operations of the Board should focus on structure rather 
than policy.  One major change would be to adopt quasi-legislative rule-
                                                                                                                           
 * R. Alexander Acosta is the Dean of the Florida International University College of Law and 
former member of the National Labor Relations Board, where he participated in or authored more than 
125 opinions.  Prior to joining FIU, he served as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida 
and as the Assistant Attorney General (Civil Rights) at the Department of Justice.  He graduated from 
Harvard College and the Harvard Law School.  This article is the publication of Dean Acosta’s lunch 
remarks at FIU Law Review’s Whither the Board Symposium on March 26, 2010. 
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making as opposed to quasi-judicial case-by-case adjudication as a means 
of issuing major policy changes.  The challenge for scholars and Board 
Members alike is to not again enumerate the advantages of rulemaking or 
other proposed solutions, but rather to help develop internal Board struc-
tures that better allow the Board to adopt this and other proposed changes.  
Structural change, I believe, is necessary to reverse the Board’s withering 
decline. 
I begin with some basic observations.   
First, the NLRB’s practical relevance is in decline.  Scholars have   
noted this.  Indeed, current NLRB Chairman Wilma Liebman1 titled her 
2007 essay on the Board “Decline and Disenchantment,” and cited dozens 
of scholars who concur in this assessment of the Board’s relevance.2      
Empirical evidence further supports this observation.  Representation and 
unfair labor practice case intake, for example, has declined by more than 
one third in the past ten years.3   
The best evidence of decline, perhaps, is the fact that the five-member 
NLRB operated with only two Members, without a quorum, from Decem-
ber 31, 2007 to April 5, 2010.4  Media coverage of this arguable crisis at the 
Board was quite limited, and legislators seemed unconcerned, as nominees 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Chairman Liebman has noted that the title Chairman should be non-gender specific. 
 2 See generally Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the 
National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569 (citing James J. Brudney, A Fa-
mous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939 
(1996); Cynthia Estlund, The Death of Labor Law?, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. (2006); Harry Sanger-
man, NLRB: DOA?, 33 EMP. REL. L. J. 74 (2007); Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y R. 375 (2007); Michel H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for 
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993); James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The 
NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221 (2005); Julius Getman, The National Labor 
Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C.L. REV. 125 (2003)). 
 3 Liebman, supra note 2, at 571 n.13 (“The Board’s representation case intake has declined by 
26% from 2005 to 2006.  From 1997 to 2007, it declined by 41%.  During that same ten-year period, 
unfair labor practice case intake declined by 31%.”) (citing BNA DAILY LABOR REPORT, Board Invento-
ry Lowest in Decades, Jan. 17, 2007, at S9).  NLRB representation case intake has since declined.  See 
72    NLRB   ANN.   REP.   10   (2007),   available   at   http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Annual_Reports/ 
NLRB2007.pdf (8.7% decrease in FY2007 (from 3,637 to 3,318 petitions filed)); 73 NLRB ANN. REP. 
11 (2008), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Annual_Reports/NLRB2008.pdf (slight 2.3% 
increase in FY2008 (from 3,318 to 3,393 petitions filed)); 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Annual_Reports/NLRB2009.pdf (14.2% decrease in FY2009 (3,393 to 
2,912 petitions filed)). 
 4 About Us: Board, NLRB.gov, http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/board/index.aspx (last 
visited July 24, 2010).  The NLRB now has five members: Chairman Wilma B. Liebman, who has 
served on the board since November 14, 1997; Peter Carey Schaumber, who has served on the board 
since March 19, 2008; Craig Becker, who was sworn in on April 5, 2010; Mark G. Pearce, who was 
sworn in on April 7, 2010; and Brian Hayes, who was sworn in on June 29, 2010.  See generally id. 
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languished in the Senate.5  Other than labor lawyers, few even seem aware 
that the federal agency supposedly charged with enforcing the labor act was 
without authority to operate for twenty-seven months.  Such near complete 
indifference about the Board’s operational legitimacy speaks volumes about 
the status of the Board in modern labor policy.   
My second point is that scholars and practitioners have offered again, 
and again, reasons and solutions for this decline.  Though many of these 
solutions are sound, the Board has routinely ignored them. 
A common criticism is that the caselaw oscillation, a.k.a. flip-flops, 
plagues Board law.  As a matter of policy, these flip-flops reduce public and 
judicial confidence in the Board.  In practice, this oscillation also reduces 
both management and labor’s reliance on Board law because neither side is 
sure what the future will hold.6 
                                                                                                                           
 5 In the one year period preceding April 2010, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and 
The Washington Post only published three articles on the topic combined: Kris Maher & Melanie 
Trottman, U.S. News: Union-Backed Nominee Is Blocked in Senate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2010, at A4 
(“The nomination of union lawyer Craig Becker to the National Labor Relations Board fell short of the 
60 votes needed to end a Republican filibuster Monday, with just 52 senators voting to support his 
appointment.  Mr. Becker’s defeat was a sharp setback for the big labor unions that championed his 
nomination.  He was strongly opposed by business interests. . . .”); Steven Greenhouse, Labor Panel Is 
Stalled by Dispute on Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at A16; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama By-
passes Senate Process, Filling 15 Posts, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2010, at A1.  Other articles were pri-
marily featured in smaller newspapers or online blogs.  See Sam Hananel, On Labor Day, Labor Board 
Still in Gridlock, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2009, at 7; Thomas Ferraro, Republicans flex new power, 
block Obama nominee, REUTERS, Feb. 9, 2010, available at  http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/09/ 
us-usa-congress-republicans-idUSTRE6185MT20100209 (“Obama, frustrated that Republicans have 
delayed votes on a number of his nominees, said on Tuesday he may make temporary ‘recess appoint-
ments’ during Congress’s break next week. ‘We can't afford to allow politics to stand in the way of a 
well-functioning government,’ Obama declared.  Recess appointees could stay in office until the end of 
next year. Republican and Democratic presidents have made such appointments, drawing outrage from 
the opposing party.  Republican Senator Orrin Hatch urged Obama not to circumvent the Senate on 
Becker, saying, ‘The Senate spoke with a loud, clear and bipartisan voice.’  The Becker battle is part of a 
bigger fight – between organized labor and business, between Democrats and Republicans – over stalled 
legislation to make it easier to unionize.”); Carter Wood, If a NLRB Quorum is So Important, Confirm 
Other Nominees, SHOPFLOOR BLOG, Feb. 19, 2010, available at http://shoopfloorblog.org2010/02/if-a-
nlrb-quorum-is-so-important-confirm-other-nominees/11022; United State Senate Democratic Commu-
nications Center, Republicans Continue Blocking Qualified Nominees, U.S. Senate Documents, Feb. 8, 
2010.  
 6 See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 
ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 163 (1985) (“The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has made the labor law 
professor’s job a nightmare.  A labor law professor’s dream, like that of any other serious academic, is to 
deal with a relatively inert body of law, to be able to read the decisions and statutes once – and only 
once – and then work up a fairly decent set of notes which can be used year after year, leaving time for 
the more worthwhile pursuits of life.  This federal agency simply won’t let us be.  These days the BNA 
labor service treats us to a reversal a week by the NLRB, sometimes coupled with notice that the Board 
has asked a court of appeals to remand a case to it for reconsideration.  How is my tennis game to im-
prove under these circumstances?”). 
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Caselaw oscillation at the Board is not new.  Consider, for example, 
whether a non-unionized workplace employee is entitled to have a co-
worker representative present during investigatory interviews.  In 1982, the 
Board interpreted Section 7 to grant a right to representation.7  Then, in 
1985, the Board reinterpreted Section 7 as not granting this right.8  In 2000, 
the Board reversed itself yet again, ruling this time in favor of representa-
tion.9  Four years later, in 2004, the Board flipped again, ruling once more 
that employees were not entitled to co-worker representation.10  Given this 
history, I predict that a Liebman Board is likely once again to flip the 2004 
precedent. 
The current scholarship critiquing flip-flops evokes a sense of déjà vu.  
Nearly ten years ago, in the summer of 2000, another of today’s speakers, 
Andrew Kramer, complained of the Board’s caselaw oscillation: 
It is evident that the significant disagreements among the Board’s cur-
rent members are based on fundamental differences on the interpreta-
tion of the Act and who is entitled to the Act’s protection. . . . These 
divisions have resulted in numerous 3-2 and 2-1 decisions and even 
led one Board member to jest that a ‘day without a dissent is like a 
day without sunshine.’ . . . [O]ne of the most troublesome issues sur-
rounding the Board has been its willingness to challenge and change 
well established precedent. Such criticisms are not new [Kramer wrote 
10 years ago].  Indeed, my objections on this point sound very similar 
to the comments made about the Board during the Reagan Administra-
tion.11 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1010 (1982) (“The General Counsel and the 
Charging Party except, contending that the Weingarten right to request the presence of a representative 
at an investigatory interview flows from the Section 7 right of employees to engage in concerted activity 
for mutual aid or protection, and does not depend upon the representational status of a particular group 
of employees.  We agree.”). 
 8 Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 230 (1985) (“Weingarten rights are inapplicable 
where, as in the case before us, there is no certified or recognized union.  Pursuant to this view, we 
overrule the Board’s contrary decision in Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).”). 
 9 Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 678 (2000) (“We disagree with the 
Board’s holdings in Sears and Dupont, and find that a return to the rule set forth in Materials Research, 
i.e., that Weingarten rights are applicable in the nonunionized workplace as well as the unionized work-
place, is warranted.”). 
 10 In re IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004) (“[W]e have decided, for the reasons set 
forth below, to overrule Epilepsy Foundation and return to earlier Board precedent holding that the 
Weingarten right does not extend to a workplace where, as here, the employees are not represented by a 
union.”). 
 11 Andrew M. Kramer, The Clinton Labor Board: Difficult Times for a Management Representa-
tive, 16 LAB. LAW. 75, 77-80 (Summer 2000) (citing NLRB Heads Into 2000 With Improved Budget, Full 
Board, New General Counsel, DAILY LAB. REP. (B.N.A.) No. 6, Jan. 10, 2000, at S-5 (interview com-
ment by Member Hurtgen)). 
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One solution to reduce caselaw oscillation is increased reliance on 
rulemaking in lieu of adjudication.  Although this solution has been       
repeatedly proposed, the Board has used rulemaking authority only rarely. 12  
As former Member Babson, who is here with us today, recalls, the last time 
the Board issued a rule was during his tenure, in 1989.  Samuel Estreicher 
and Jeffrey Lubbers will elaborate on the value of rulemaking when they 
speak later today and tomorrow, so I will note only that courts and scholars 
consistently cite several advantages, including but not limited to: 
Predictability – Management, labor and employees would know 
which rules apply to their conduct, especially since rulemaking unlike 
caselaw, is entirely prospective.13   
Efficiency – A clear rule would allow early resolution of recurring 
issues, obviating the need for repeated Board consideration of similar 
fact patterns.14 
Stability – Although the rulemaking process is burdensome, once 
adopted, this same burdensome process makes a rule very difficult to 
change.15 
Judicial Deference – As Jeffrey Hirsch will discuss later today, it 
appears that Courts of Appeals devalue Board decisions.  Appellate 
success would increase as greater deference is paid to rules.16 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, Thirty-Ninth Annual Administrative Law Issue: 
Administrative Law Under the George W. Bush Administration: Looking Back and Looking Forward: 
Article: The NLRB In Administrative Law Exile: Problems With Its Structure and Function and Sugges-
tions for Reform, 58 DUKE L. J. 2013, 2016 (2009) (“For decades, academic and judicial critics of the 
Board have urged it to embrace rulemaking, especially for cases in which it contemplates overruling 
precedent.”); see also id. at 2016 n.12 (citing Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule 
Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); James J. Brudney, 
Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221 (2005); Sam-
uel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN L. REV. 163 
(1985); Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 
70 YALE L.J. 729 (1960); Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board’s Perfor-
mance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968); Clyde W. 
Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93 (1954); Ronald Turner, 
Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707 (2006); 
George W. Chesrow, Comment, NLRB Policymaking: The Rulemaking-Adjudication Dilemma Revisited 
in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559 (1975)). 
 13 Jeffrey Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 411, 414 (2010) 
(citing Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 649 
(2008)). 
 14 Lubbers, supra note 13, at 415 (citing Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The 
Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163-64 (1986)). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id.; see also Jeffrey Hirsch, Defending the NLRB: Improving the Agency’s Success in the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals, 5 FIU L. REV. 437 (2010). 
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Rulemaking could have more subtle benefits as well.  Only the more 
difficult fact-patterns reach the Board unsettled, and we know that bad facts 
often make bad law.  Difficult fact patterns are rarely the best vehicle for 
announcing a new approach.17  Rulemaking would also be more democratic, 
providing the public greater notice and an opportunity to comment.18     
Finally, as Estreicher has noted, rules would more clearly guide the General 
Counsel in determining when to issue complaints.19 
The rulemaking solution, likewise, is not new.  Estreicher has been ad-
vocating for this shift for decades.20  Lubbers’s paper provides an excellent 
history both of scholarly support for rulemaking, dating as far back as 1961, 
and of the Board’s equally longstanding resistance to this solution.21     
Lubbers’s discussion of the so-called obstacles to rulemaking – whether 
ossification, the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Congressional Review 
Act – reveal that the policy and legal challenges to rulemaking can be over-
come.22  Finally, and most obviously, the best evidence that these obstacles 
can be surmounted is the simple fact that almost every other federal agency 
relies on rulemaking despite these so-called obstacles. 
So the question is this: if the NLRB is in decline in part because of its 
historic reliance on unpredictable, case-by-case adjudication, and if rule-
making can alleviate this unpredictability, then why has the NLRB been so 
reluctant to engage in rulemaking? 
The initial answer, I argue, begins with the Board’s early history.  Joan 
Flynn traced this history well, in her 2000 article, A Quiet Revolution at the 
Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935-2000. 23 The NLRB 
was modeled in part after the National Labor Board (NLB).  The NLB had 
been set up as a representative body with an equal number of industry and 
labor representatives, along with a neutral chair charged with representing 
the public interest.  The original 1935 bill establishing the NLRB contained 
the same structure.  The original reference to partisan representatives, how-
ever, was replaced with “three impartial Government members,” in        
response to a congressional determination that the NLRB should be an ad-
                                                                                                                           
 17 Id. at 5. 
 18 Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act Without 
Statutory Change, 5 FIU L. REV. 361 (2010) (“In essence, the regulated public would be told in advance 
which prior decisions the Board is interested in possibly reversing and would be asked to address specif-
ic questions and identify sources of information that would aid the agency.”). 
 19 Estreicher, supra note 6, at 177. 
 20 See generally Estreicher, supra note 6. 
 21 See generally Lubbers, supra note 14. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 
1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1363-65 (2000). 
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judicatory body more akin to a “labor judiciary” of neutrals as opposed to 
an NLB-like mediatory body of representatives.24  
This system worked well at first, as Presidents selected neutrals to 
serve on a labor judiciary.  This began to change, Flynn showed, in the early 
1950s – when President Eisenhower nominated Guy Farm, a management 
attorney, and Albert Beeson, a management industrial relations director.  
The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) objected to these nomina-
tions on the grounds that they were management representatives as opposed 
to true neutrals.  The CIO noted that on the union-side, no union lawyer had 
ever been appointed to the Board.  The Senate minority also opposed con-
firmation, arguing that the Board had been conceived as a “quasi-judicial 
agency” with impartial as opposed to representative members.25   
The issue resurfaced a little more than a decade later when President 
Nixon nominated Edward Miller, a lawyer with 23 years of experience rep-
resenting management.  As Flynn explained, AFL-CIO President George 
Meany objected vigorously to Miller’s nomination, noting again that     
organized labor had never sought the appointment of a union-side lawyer.26  
The Senate, however, confirmed the nomination.27 
The next time around, the AFL-CIO did not merely object.  In 1983, 
when President Reagan sought to appoint management attorneys to the 
Board, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland wrote to then Senate Labor 
Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch: 
In the past . . . we sought the appointment of individuals who . . . had 
not been the agents of management or labor.  It has been our consid-
ered position that this degree of forbearance is necessary in the         
interest of assuring both justice and the appearance of justice in a 
highly adversarial field. . . . These nominations . . . are the final evi-
dence that . . . there will be no reciprocal restraint.  I wish, therefore, 
to state that as a matter of practical self-protection we hereby re-
nounce our prior positions in this regard. . . . [A]ll the old rules are off. 
. . . I would regard us as privileged to follow the same practice and to 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. at 1364, n. 12 (citing Staff of Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong., Comparison 
of S. 2926 (73d Congress) and S. 1958 (74th Congress) § 3 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 Leg. 
Hist. of the NLRA).   
 25 Flynn, supra note 23 at 1374. 
 26 Meany wrote:  “It would, of course, be both possible and proper to have a tripartite Labor 
Board, with members designated as representing the public, labor and management. . . . However, the 
NLRB in this country is not set up on that basis. . . . We believe . . . that no one should be appointed to 
the Board from the ranks of labor or management, and that includes union lawyers and employer law-
yers.”  Hearings on Nomination of Edward B. Miller, 91st Cong. 35 (1970) (statement of George 
Meany, President, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations). 
 27 Flynn, supra note 23 at 1375-76. 
354 FIU Law Review [5:347 
 
put forth partisans of that temper, if we again come into a position 
where we might be  able  to  have  some  persuasive  influence  over  
an  Administration . . . . 28 
Since then, Flynn explains – with some exceptions – NLRB Members 
have arrived at the Board with a lengthy history of representing either    
management or labor.29 
This history helps explain why the Board, in contrast with most ad-
ministrative agencies, has clung to its historical process of case-by-case 
adjudication.  The Board early on established itself in the model of a labor 
judiciary.  Board Members sit in panels of three, to hear appeals from ALJs.  
On occasion, when precedent is to be overruled, the Board sits en banc as a 
panel of five. 
Like a court, the Board does not proactively reach out for issues.  It 
has delegated prosecutorial authority to the General Counsel.  Much like a 
common law court of appeals, the Board waits for cases to raise issues and 
announces new rules through caselaw. 
The Board’s internal structure reflects this quasi-judicial approach.  
Each Member has a staff of attorneys who function as law clerks.  The 
Chair has an additional staff member to address administrative matters.  
The staffing is analogous to a court, where each judge has his or her own 
law clerks, with the Chief Judge having an additional clerk charged with 
administrative responsibilities.   
This history helps explain why the Board’s caselaw flip-flops so often.  
The NLRB quasi-judicial decision-making structure was adopted seventy-
five years ago in response to Congress’ intent that the Board operate as a 
labor judiciary.  The NLRB’s membership, by contrast, has strayed from 
this path.  The NLRB today is comprised of Members who consider them-
selves quasi-representatives of labor or management with an occasional 
neutral.  However, quasi-representatives continue to use the Board’s       
seventy-five-year-old quasi-judicial decision-making infrastructure.  As a 
result, Board caselaw oscillates, as Board Members reverse prior precedent 
in tune to the shifting balance of power between quasi-representatives for 
labor and management.   
This early history and the quasi-judicial structure it produced, I be-
lieve, also present the principle obstacles to rulemaking.  The Board lacks 
experience operating outside its quasi-judicial model.  An example of this 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Flynn, supra note 23, at 1389 (citing letter from AFL-CIO President Kirkland to Sen. Hatch (R-
Utah), Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1983) and a press conference given by AFL-CIO 
President Kirkland). 
 29 See Flynn, supra note 23. 
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structural challenge is the Board’s only successful rulemaking.  The Board’s 
successful 1989 health care rule, as Professor Lubbers points out, was 
promulgated only after public hearings were held in Washington, Chicago, 
and San Francisco – during which the Board heard testimony from 144 wit-
nesses.30  The Board’s reliance on multiple hearings, structured like a judi-
cial adjudicative process, delayed and complicated the rulemaking process 
substantially.31  If modern agencies had to rely on similarly cumbersome 
procedures, the Code of Federal Regulations would be much shorter.   
The Board again attempted rulemaking in the 1990s, this time unsuc-
cessfully. 32  Contemporaries were quick to cast blame, with some pointing 
to Congress and others to the rather outspoken Chairman who some argued 
overstepped and overreached.  Then Chairman and now Stanford Professor 
Gould’s own memoir offers insight into both the policy benefits of, and the 
Board’s structural lack of preparedness for, rulemaking.   
Rulemaking was peculiarly suited to another problem that had affected 
the  Board  since  the  Eisenhower  administration.   With  each  new  
president . . . the  Board’s  philosophy  on  major  policy  issues  
swing[s]  in  a  new direction. . . . I thought that rulemaking would 
diminish these rapid shifts. . . . It would thus strengthen the doctrine of 
stare decisis. . . . Rulemaking, because it would put the public on     
notice, would overcome the problem of lack of input I was simultane-
ously attempting to solve. . . . And because a detailed justification for 
each rule would be provided, future Boards might be inhibited from 
wholesale reversals. . . .33   
Our efforts were not wholly successful because rulemaking . . . neces-
sarily attracted a good deal of attention early in the process.  This 
meant that pressure against a rule members of Congress did not like 
could  be  brought  to  bear  before  the  Board  made  its  final  deci-
sions. . . .34 
What we had not foreseen . . . was the fact that rulemaking, by its very 
nature, generates publicity. . . . By using rulemaking . . . we advertised 
what we were thinking of doing before we did it, thus inviting politi-
                                                                                                                           
 30 JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 129 (2006). 
 31 Id. at 312. 
 32 Lubbers, supra note 13, at 10. 
 33 WILLIAM B. GOULD, IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB – A MEMOIR 72 
(2001). 
 34 Id. at 72-73. 
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cal interference. . . . [T]his kind of interference could stop the Board 
in the starting-block.35 
Adjudication, on the other hand, was a different matter. . . . We care-
fully released . . . controversial decisions without any fanfare.  In that 
case, it was a long time before anyone even noticed.  Of course, when 
they did, there were hostile reactions, but by then the Board had al-
ready taken action and Congress had passed our budget.  So the pub-
licity came after the horse was out of the barn.  In rulemaking . . . the 
opposite was true.36 
Chairman Gould’s comments evoke several thoughts.  One is that 
Chairman Gould and the Board were woefully unprepared for and           
inexperienced with rulemaking.  To say that Chairman Gould did not      
anticipate publicity on an issue like a Beck rulemaking demonstrates the 
Board’s naïvete.  Chairman Gould certainly clashed with the Republicans in 
Congress, which undoubtedly brought pressure to bear regarding the 
Board’s proposed rules.37  Agencies experienced with rulemaking would 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. at 173. 
 36 Id. at 173-74. 
 37 Id. at 72 (“[Rule making] would thus strengthen the doctrine of stare decisis – a judicial princi-
ple to which I had expressed fidelity in responding to a question Senator Hatch asked me in my confir-
mation hearing. . . . Our efforts were not wholly successful because rule making, like oral arguments 
(and we held a record number of oral arguments), necessarily attracted a good deal of attention early in 
the process.  This meant that pressure against a rule members of Congress did not like could be brought 
to bear before the Board made its final decision.  This is what happened in connection with our rule-
making proposal on single-facility units when we brought it forward near the beginning of the Hundred 
and Fourth Congress in 1995.  Several Board members were genuinely sympathetic to rule making and 
to the objectives of this proposal; but they also wanted to be reappointed and so were not immune to 
political pressure.  And there was political pressure aplenty.  The new Republican Congress wanted us, 
in Congressman James Talent’s (R-Mo.) words, to “flip” as well as “flop” on the single-location cases.  
The Republicans clearly feared that this rule would expedite NLRB elections, facilitate union organiz-
ing, and promote recruitment of new union members (a prospect their patrons abhorred) – and that it 
would be difficult to reverse.”); id. at 172-73 (“The drumbeat of criticism continued and was eventually 
embodied in a rider to our 1996 appropriations bill.  It precluded the expenditure of any funds on the 
proposed rule and ensured that the issue would be nothing more than a debating point during my term of 
office.  The proposed rule on appropriate bargaining units appeared to dwarf, or at least diminish, con-
gressional anger over our handling of “salting” cases (which involved employer retaliation against paid 
union organizers who were also employees) and use of Section 10(j) injunction actions.  (The House 
Republicans had enacted a rider requiring a four-vote Board majority to authorize injunctions but it was 
not in the final bill.) In fact, the focus on rule making gave us somewhat greater discretion in the Section 
10(j) arena.  After all, there were only so many issues Congress could use to control us through the 
appropriations process – given the hostility of some senators (e.g., Specter) to legislation by appropria-
tions rider.  In the 1996 budget, rulemaking was the one “chit” House Republicans managed to cash 
in.”); id. at 255 (“Obey had advised me well.  I had indeed become the House Republicans’ number one 
enemy.  This status was hardly surprising, given the Republican view of the National Labor Relations 
Act, my confirmation difficulties, the policies I pursued, and the balanced relationship between labor 
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have predicted and been prepared for a response like this.  Although rule-
making typically triggers political pressure from all sides, agencies find 
paths through the omnipresent political thicket and enact rules.   
Chairman Gould’s comments also reveal a disturbing hostility to 
transparency and an unfortunate deference to institutional inertia.  Rather 
than develop expertise in rulemaking, the Chairman’s response to the chal-
lenges presented by a rulemaking was simply to return to the old way of 
doing things despite his own belief that this old, quasi-judicial approach, 
was flawed.  It was simply easier to return to the Board’s safe, historical, 
less transparent, adjudicatory decision-making system.  And the Board has 
remained there ever since. 
To engage in successful future rulemakings, the Board must first over-
come this institutional inertia and adjust its internal structure so that it is 
prepared for the quasi-legislative act that is rulemaking.  It should learn 
from other agencies and it should hire staff experienced with the specific 
challenges of rulemaking.  The authority to hire Board staff and economic 
experts would facilitate rulemaking, as the Board’s practice of eschewing 
internal experts and instead relying on amici – again a quasi-judicial tradi-
tion – presents a challenge to rulemaking.  The Board, likewise, must be 
prepared to make the political, staffing, and budgetary commitments       
necessary to respond to the costs that will be exacted at first, as Congress 
and others again try tactics like those tried against Chairman Gould.  The 
first rule in decades will not be easy for the Board to enact.   
To my mind, however, this price is worth paying.  Many of the        
criticisms leveled at the Board flow from the Board’s tendency to use quasi-
judicial adjudication to announce quasi-legislative rules.  Although       
technically legal, this reliance on adjudication as a mechanism to bypass the 
democratic pressure ancillary to rulemaking opens the Board to criticism, in 
part because key decisions read more like policy briefings than legal     
opinions.   
During my time on the Board, I thought long about how Members 
should approach decision-making.  In essence, I believe Members have 
both a quasi-judicial and a quasi-legislative role.  When applying existing 
precedents to facts, there is little room for personal policy preference.  
Here, legal reasoning and stare decisis are at their strongest.  Members have 
an obligation to remain neutral and to apply prior precedent.  In those     
settings, I would often vote with then-Members Liebman or Walsh, to the 
consternation of some colleagues and some individuals of the labor bar. 
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Sometimes, however, Members are called upon to re-examine the    
wisdom of a precedent.  This requires Members to draws upon their role as 
administrative quasi-legislators, applying their expertise and their own   
policy preference.  Reflective discretion to reconsider rules is an            
appropriate role for an executive appointee to an administrative agency.  In 
these contexts, my inclinations likely diverge from the now-Chairman.  In 
these quasi-legislative contexts, however, rulemaking is the preferred path. 
Board Members know when they are wearing which hat.  Take In re 
IBM, for example.  In overruling Epilepsy Foundation, the majority wrote:  
[We] conclude that the policy considerations supporting that decision 
do not warrant, particularly at this time, adherence to the holding in 
Epilepsy Foundation. In recent years, there have been many changes 
in the workplace environment, including ever-increasing requirements 
to conduct workplace investigations, as well as new security concerns 
raised by incidents of national and workplace violence.   
Our consideration of these features of the contemporary workplace 
leads us to conclude that an employer must be allowed to conduct its 
required investigations in a thorough, sensitive, and confidential man-
ner.  This can best be accomplished by permitting an employer in a 
nonunion setting to investigate an employee without the presence of a 
coworker.38 
Here, the majority’s decision was not based on law; it admits that Epi-
lepsy offers an acceptable interpretation.  Instead, the majority’s decision to 
change caselaw was based on “policy considerations.”  Its reasoning was 
quasi-legislative. 
In response, then-Members Liebman and Walsh wrote:   
Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg acknowledge that the 
Board’s decision in Epilepsy Foundation is ‘a permissible interpreta-
tion of the Act,’ but invoke ‘policy considerations’ for refusing to ad-
here to it, and Member Schaumber endorses those considerations. The 
decision to overrule a recent precedent, carefully reasoned and upheld 
in the courts, should be based on far more compelling reasons than our 
colleagues have articulated.39  
I agree, in one sense, with Member Liebman.  The decision should 
have been based on a fuller record.  In fact, it should have been based on 
the type of record that would result from public notice and comment.  I 
                                                                                                                           
 38 In re IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. at 1290. 
 39 Id. at 1308. 
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disagree, however, with Members Liebman and Walsh to the extent that 
they believe that the majority, acting as policy-makers, should not reach 
such a decision.  As quasi-legislators, the majority had that right, much like 
the Liebman Board will have a right to reach an opposite conclusion. 
Members Liebman’s and Walsh’s real criticism is not that the majority 
exercised its quasi-legislative right to change policy, but rather that the ma-
jority changed policy within an adjudicatory setting ill-suited to developing 
a fuller record that includes notice and comment.  Their criticism is         
accurate, but until the Board is ready to engage in rulemaking in lieu of 
adjudication, their criticism is also misplaced.   
Is the Board ready to engage in rulemaking in lieu of adjudication?  
Then-Member Liebman’s minority dissent implies that it may be, yet now-
Chairman Liebman’s majority Board may feel compelled to follow the    
safer, historical path of reversing prior precedent through adjudication.  
With this in mind, I would like to close with some unsolicited advice to my 
former colleague.  To the Chairman, I respectfully urge the courage to    
follow what her predecessor, Chairman Gould, called a perilous path.   
I hear that Chairman Liebman has some interest in rulemaking.  I urge 
her courage because the value of rulemaking will be underappreciated by 
most.  The labor bar, on all sides, benefits from the oscillation and obfusca-
tion of the adjudicatory system.  With each presidential cycle, both       
management and labor hire lawyers anew to seek or defend against the re-
versal of prior precedent.  Likewise, some in the Board’s hierarchy oppose 
rulemaking, as their traditional interests in quasi-adjudicative structures are 
threatened.  The political pressures brought to bear on the first rulemaking 
will be substantial.  Challenges in Courts of Appeals will ensue.  Against 
this, the praise of a few law professors and even a few former Board Mem-
bers will be a small shield. 
In the end, however, rulemaking will enhance the legitimacy and rele-
vance of the NLRB by more clearly delineating quasi-judicial functions 
(whether fact-finding or law-finding) from quasi-legislative functions.  This 
will help stabilize Board law and restore public and judicial confidence in 
the agency.  Rulemaking will bring the Board’s seventy-five-year old struc-
ture into alignment with that of a modern administrative agency.  Once   
accustomed to rulemaking, the Board will operate more smoothly as it 
aligns its structures with those of other agencies in the modern administra-
tive state.   
To the future minority, I would like to suggest rulemaking as well.  I 
was speaking with a friend in the minority about my remarks today.  He 
said rulemaking was a bad idea at this time.  That is not a good reason to 
stop a good idea.  Under that logic, there will never be a good time to im-
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prove operations at the Board, as someone will always be in the minority.  
Good governance should trump particular results.     
The Board in 2010 is operating under a pre-World War II quasi-
judicial administrative agency model.  Rulemaking is a better, more demo-
cratic, more stable, more transparent, and more modern path for quasi-
legislative enactments.  Scholars, including those present at this            
symposium, have suggested other important changes that may likewise 
benefit the Board.  The challenge we now face, as scholars and former and 
current Board Members, is how to move beyond the enumeration of policy 
advantages and focus on practical, structural changes that can support 
Board efforts to implement rulemaking and other suggested changes,     
assuming that the Board in fact chooses to change.  Unless the Board    
modernizes its structure, I fear that in ten years, at the Board’s eighty-fifth 
anniversary, we will be discussing the challenges faced by an even less rel-
evant NLRB.   
 
